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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000998

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR BRIAN WALCH
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR MICHELLE GAVIN

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [ZI](#) [SF](#)
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAY'S VISIT WITH SOUTH AFRICAN
AMBASSADOR TO ZIM

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES A. RAY FOR REASONS 1.4 B,D

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The key issues for South Africa in Zimbabwe are political stability and economic stability/recovery. Problems in the way of that stem from ZANU-PF's inability to manage its own internal cohesion. There needs to be more coordination of all donors in Zimbabwe. Engagement with all parties here is crucial, as is security sector reform (SSR). U.S. support for SSR is important, but there must be no U.S. fingerprints on the process. Failure of SSR could be catastrophic. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SBU) I met with South African Ambassador Mlungisi Makalima at his embassy on December 18. Under the previous administration in Pretoria, he was not always informed of his own government's actions regarding Zimbabwe, and had been reluctant to have too much contact with us. Under President Zuma, he seems to be better tied into what is going on, and said that he would like more frequent contact and coordination. South Africa's key issues in Zimbabwe are to see a return to political and economic stability. In addition, RSA would like to see economic recovery. A prosperous Zimbabwe is a linchpin in the region, he said, and likewise, if the country is an economic failure, it negatively impacts the region. The Zimbabwean economy is also important to South Africa bilaterally, and politically, as they would like to see a reduction in the flow of people southward.

¶3. (C) Makalima said that one of the impediments to political progress has been the failure of ZANU-PF to manage its internal cohesion well. There is a lot of disaffection within the party, making it difficult to get a coordinated response, and this has given the hardliners the upper hand. He said he was taken aback at the resolutions that came out of the recently-concluded party congress. Some of them seemed a clear slap at South Africa. One must, however, learn to read between the lines of pronouncements from ZANU-PF, he said. It is likely the resolutions were meant to placate party hardliners. The problem, according to Makalima, is that ZANU-PF seems to lack vision and direction. This is creating internal problems that will some day come back to haunt Mugabe and the other senior leadership.

¶4. (C) There is a need for broader coordination among all countries involved here to avoid conflict and duplication of projects. Makalima said that he would like very much to have

closer contact with the U.S. and EU heads of mission to see where we can work better together. (COMMENT: We have approached the German Ambassador, who currently chairs the EU plus donor group known as the Fishmongers, and he agrees in principle to more contact. END COMMENT). Makalima noted, for instance, that South Africa has had only minimal involvement in creating the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), and it probably should be more involved. (COMMENT: At the last Fishmonger meeting, there was discussion of South Africa contributing to the MDTF, but concern on the part of some of Qcontributing to the MDTF, but concern on the part of some of the EU ambassadors that this would mean they would want to have a significant role in the decision process. The consensus seemed to be that South Africa's priorities differ from the EU and this would not be a good thing. END COMMENT). I mentioned to Makalima that there needed to be coordination of priorities, especially regarding infrastructure development projects, and he agreed that this is essential. He did not commit, however, to any substantial change in his country's priorities, which, at the end of the day will continue to be those that support South Africa's own domestic economy.

15. (C) The donor countries must have broader engagement with all parties in Zimbabwe, Makalima said, as they must all be part of any solution to the country's problems. While we must continue to strengthen the democratic opposition, it is crucial that we find ways to engage productively with ZANU-PF; in particular to identify potential reform-minded moderates within the party. Security sector reform is absolutely essential, as without it, there is little chance of political or economic reforms being sustainable. In this,

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he said, we must also engage all parties. Failure of security sector reform could cause unimaginable chaos which would threaten the stability of the entire region. U.S. support for security reform is important, but there should be no U.S. fingerprints on the program to avoid arousing the suspicions of and possible disruption from hardliners in ZANU-PF who continue to believe our main aim is regime change.

16. (C) COMMENT: Makalima is absolutely correct in his view that donors here need to better coordinate their efforts. The major donors (Fishmongers) mean well, but often seem suspicious of the motives of donors like South Africa and China. They also operate out of force of habit. For their parts, countries like South Africa and China have not done much to change the situation. We are quietly trying to pull all these components together to see if we can change a static situation in Zimbabwe for the better. While more contact with these "peripheral" embassies might not work, it can't hurt. END COMMENT.

RAY